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Don’t Let the Sun Go Down on Me: 
The German Constitutional Court and Its Lisbon Judgement 
 
1. Introduction: The Karlsruhe Conundrum 
It was in May 2000 that Joschka Fischer spent ninety minutes in front of a gathered 
audience at Berlin’s Humboldt University with his Foreign Minister-hat ‘removed’. In his 
speech Fischer outlined a bold and ambitious vision for the European Union1 and 
followed a tradition of post-war German politicians championing European unity and 
integration.2 In fact, Fischer’s speech inspired other heads of state and government at the 
time so much that a significant number of leaders followed his lead and delivered their 
own vision of Europe during the following six months3. This started off what was to 
become the Debate on the Future of Europe4 that culminated in the Convention on the 
Future of Europe,5 the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe6 and later on the 
Lisbon Treaty. The German Constitutional Court in its June 2009 judgement on said 
Treaty,7 though declaring it compatible with the German Basic Law, failed to live up to 
the visionary example set by many German politicians and pointed out above. Instead the 
Court positioned itself as a euro-sceptic voice seemingly poised to slow down the 
European project – if not determined to strike down any future attempts at integration in 
new policy areas.  
 
                                                       
1 Fischer (2000). 
2 Former German Chancellors Konrad Adenauer, Helmuth Schmidt and Helmuth Kohl were all known 
for their outspoken support and vision of a united Europe. 
3 See, e.g. Blair (2000); Chirac (2000); Jospin (2000); Rau (2001). 
4 The dedicated Futurum website and since been taken offline by the European Commission. 
5 See http://european-convention.eu.int. 
6 Official Journal of the European Union (2004). 
7 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 421). See also 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html 
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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
 2 
Although the President of the Court’s Second Senate proclaimed that ‘Das Grundgesetz 
sagt ‘Ja’ zum Vertrag von Lissabon’8, it ruled that the accompanying laws passed by the 
Bundestag to incorporate the Lisbon Treaty9 needed to be revised before German 
ratification could be completed. In Germany, the judgement meant that the pro-Lisbon 
majority among the national political leadership – across both government and opposition 
parties – were reassured that the ratification process could be completed prior to the 
second Irish referendum, scheduled for 2 October 2009. Yet, the Lisbon-critical forces 
were also encouraged mainly because of the 72 pages of ‘small print’10 that the judges 
deemed necessary in order to explain their decision which turned the ‘Ja zu Lissabon’ 
effectively into a ‘Ja, aber …’. 
 
The detailed legal ramifications and judicial nuances of the treaty have been commented 
on already.11 The aim of this paper is to explore the political consequences that the legal 
reasoning of Europe’s most influential national constitutional Court may have on the 
future relationship between Germany and the EU as well as the European integration 
project as a whole. It is clear that the judgement is not a ringing endorsement of the 
European integration process. Rather the Court uses its long verdict to establish itself as 
the national guardian of German sovereignty on the basis of the legal boundaries set by 
the Grundgesetz. Of course, the Court is within its rights to do so – but it is not obliged to 
do so because it is interpreting the existing legal status. As many commentators would 
agree with, the judges’ interpretation is far from uncontroversial. Thus, this article sets 
out to make a normative argument about the judgement’s shortcomings and its potential 
                                                       
8 See http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/lissabon102.html.  
9 For the vote on the issue, see Bundestag Stenographisher Bericht 16/157, S. 16483 A 
(http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16157.pdf); for the text of the original accompanying laws see 
Bundesdrucksache 16/8489 (http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/084/1608489.pdf) and 
Bundesdrucksache 16/8919 (http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/089/1608919.pdf).  
10 The English language version has 72 pages – slight variations in length of the German version may 
be possible. 
11 For a critical view see Halberstam and Möllers  (2009) and for a supportive analysis see Schorkopf 
(2009). 
Electronic copy available at: ht ps: /ssrn.co /abstract=1499651
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political ramification for German-EU relation as well as the wider European integration 
process. The judgement addresses a wide range of important issues related to legitimacy, 
democracy and sovereignty. The following sections will address these issues by exploring 
the Court’s reasoning with regards to the division of competences between the national 
and European level, the legitimacy of the European Parliament as a supranational 
assembly and the role of national parliaments in the European integration process.  
 
2. The ultra vires virus 
The Court clearly used the Lisbon judgement to elaborate on its 1992 Maastricht 
decision12, in which it declared the Treaty of Maastricht as compatible with the 
Grundgesetz but claimed legal guardianship over potential infringements by the EU into 
areas of national, i.e. German, competences.13 In spite of its words, the Court, however, 
never acted upon the implied Maastricht ‘promise’ to use ultra vires judicial review to 
control or even prevent an expansion of EU legislation and competences and thereby 
defending the sovereignty of the German legal system. The fact that it is brought up again 
seems to indicate its readiness to take up the task that the Court set itself first in the 1973 
Solange Judgement14 and followed up in its judgements of 198715 and 1992 (Maastricht) 
seventeen years ago. 
 
A clear indication for the Court’s ambition to become more active and use ultra vires 
reviews to contain integrationist moves, is the list of competences that have ‘always been 
deemed especially sensitive for the ability of a constitutional state to democratically 
shape itself.’16 Clearly, what is meant by this is that there are certain policy areas that 
must remain at the national level if sovereign member states continue to exist and are not 
                                                       
12 Bverfg, Case 2 BVR 464/98. 
13 Weiler (1995) and Baquero Cruz (2008). 
14 BverfGE 37,  271 (Solange I). 
15 BverfGE 73,  339 (Solange II). 
16 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 252. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
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to dissolve into a fully federated European Union. According to the verdict, these areas 
are for instance criminal law, the use of force (police and military), fiscal policy, the 
social state, and cultural policies including education, family and religious law and laws 
regulating religion. The list seems arbitrary and the Court gives no indication as to the 
reasoning behind its selection. Policy areas such as the power to print money or 
conducting trade negotiations would surely be considered ‘state-defining’ to the same 
extent as the five issues listed by the Court. Despite a vivid and ongoing debate in 
academia about the Europeanisation of private law,17 there is no mentioning of this legal 
area in the Court’s list. Although Lisbon does not explicitly grant new powers to the EU 
in these new policy areas, they are, of course, those policy fields in which further 
integration is expected over the coming years. For the German Court to include this 
seemingly arbitrary list must surely mean that, after the warning shots that were given up 
by the 1992 Maastricht judgement (in a time when the popular support of the European 
integration project was much more pronounced), it is now preparing to take a much more 
active part in monitoring the detailed effect of EU integration on the German legal and 
political system. 
 
Of course, the Lisbon Treaty itself is not attempting to transfer powers in any of these 
policy areas from the national to the EU level. Thus, the Court does not see any reason to 
strike down the Treaty on the basis of competence transfer. So why address the issue of 
state sovereignty in the first place? Considering that the Court’s overall euro-cautious 
tone applies throughout the judgement, it seems clear that the judges foresee future treaty 
changes or even competence expansion based on the current Treaty Article 308 EC (see 
below). The Court is thus positioning itself to potentially strike down these integrationist 
moves. By including a state-defining competence list, the Court lays the legal foundation 
                                                       
17 See, e.g., the H.i.i.L. Project on ‘National Resistance to the Europeanisation of Private Law’ at the 
University of Tilburg; www.tilburguniversity.nl/faculties/law/research/ticom/research/hiil_nrepl.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
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upon which it can build its ultra vires reviews of future EU legislation or even 
competence expansion by preventing ’legal instruments […] that transgress competences 
or that violate constitutional identity […] and […] keep within the boundaries of the 
sovereign powers accorded to them by way of conferred power.’18 The Court even goes as 
far as to stipulate that the German legislature would need to create a new legal 
mechanism specifically aimed at facilitating ultra vires review ‘to safeguard the 
obligation of German bodies not to apply in Germany, in individual cases, legal 
instruments of the European Union that transgress competences or that violate 
constitutional identity.’19 Clearly, all indications suggest that – Lisbon or no Lisbon – we 
can brace ourselves for a much more euro-critical German Constitutional Court that is 
keen to scrutinize EU legislation in order to safeguard the German legal order against any 
further integrationist moves. 
 
3. 1230 for 1 or the EP slap-down  
In its build-up to striking down the accompanying laws that are required to make the 
Lisbon Treaty legally applicable in Germany, the Court seemingly en passant takes a 
swing at the European Parliament by raising questions of its legitimacy and democratic 
viability as a democratic actor. The Bundesverfassungsgericht acknowledges that the EP 
may contribute to the legitimacy of the European Union but in its view it cannot.  
 
The key criticism by the Court is based on the fact that the election procedure to the 
European Parliament is not based on a strict one-person one-vote principle. Instead there 
are national quotas that allocate a specific number of seats to each member state. The 
numbers are adjusted to broadly reflect the population size of the different members but, 
of course, they are not exactly proportional. The Court elaborates on this point and, whilst 
                                                       
18 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 241. 
19 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 241. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
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striking down the case’s complainant’s claim that this means that the EU is undemocratic 
and thus the Treaty of Lisbon is incompatible with the German Basic Law, elaborates on 
its view that the European Parliament ‘is not a body of representation of a sovereign 
European people20. ‘The fundamental rule of electoral equality thus ‘only applies within a 
people, not in a supranational body of representation, which remains a representation of 
the peoples linked to each other by the Treaties.’21 Of course, from a practical perspective 
the EP can never be a one-person one-vote chamber, due to the very nature of the 
European Union as a Union of states and peoples. In such a sui generis union, even the 
lower chamber, in federal state system the one that is traditionally much more (though 
never completely)22 proportionate in its representation, must always allow smaller 
countries and their citizens to be represented. Since the European Parliament would need 
to have at least 1230 seats for all member states to have at least one seat, it is very likely 
that the EU will never adopt a fully proportionate system. The problem arises from the 
logic that the Court takes away from this: ‘the European Union, as a supranational 
organisation, must comply as before with the principle of conferral that is exercised in a 
restricted and controlled manner.’23 ‘The deficit in the direct track of legitimisation of the 
European public authority that is based on the election of the Members of the European 
Parliament.’24  Thus, in characterising the EU as a supranational organisation, and (only 
thereby) deeming the Treaty of Lisbon as compatible with the German constitution, the 
Court denies any developments towards a politically more integrated Union. It seems that 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht uses its judgement to draw a line in the sand. As the Lisbon 
Treaty comes right up to this line, future integration attempts look like they are destined 
                                                       
20 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 280.  
21 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 279. 
22 Even in Germany with the frequent occurrence of Überhangmandate as well as the 5 per cent 
threshold a misrepresentation of parties in relation to their actual share of the votes is the norm. This is 
without even considering the parliamentary legitimacy according to the German Constitutional Court 
with regards to the Bundesrat (which the Court deems to ‘be […]a chamber of a National Parliament’) 
or even the election of the US President. 
23 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 298. 
24 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 293. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
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to be bounced back (behind the line) by the Karlsruhe Court. It is therefore not so much 
what the Court says about Lisbon with respect to EP legitimacy but rather what it says 
about the nature of the European Union and the essence of the European integration 
process that makes this a judgement that will most certainly come back to haunt the 
Europhiles among us.  
 
4. The Bundestag to the Rescue 
The Court’s analysis of legitimacy in the Union of ‘conferred powers’, is then cleverly 
linked to the issue of legitimacy through the citizens at the member state level. The Court, 
facing a Union that is not a federal state but only a Staatenverbund,25 clarifies that 
legitimacy must therefore come from the citizens through national elections and national 
parliaments to the EU level of governance. It refers explicitly to the ‘legitimising 
connection of elections and other votes […].’26 And whilst not striking down the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Court goes on to rule that a revision of the accompanying laws that were 
passed by the Bundestag and Bundesrat in April 2008 is necessary. The Court’s reasoning 
provided for the requirement for redrafting these focuses on two issues in the Lisbon 
Treaty: the passerelle clause (Article 48.7 TFEU) and the flexibility clause (Article 352 
TFEU). The former allows member state governments, by a unanimous vote in the 
European Council (and following consent by national parliaments as well as the European 
Parliament) to move existing competences from a special legislative procedure (i.e. 
unanimity voting) to the ordinary legislative procedure (i.e. qualified majority voting). 
The latter provides for the possibility to obtain legislative power for the Union to achieve 
specific objectives already set out in the Treaties, but where the Treaties have not 
provided the necessary powers to the European Union. This clause is based on the current 
                                                       
25 Unfortunately, the Court does not provide us with a definition of this newly created term. 
26 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 295. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
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Article 308 EC, which, however, is restricted to just the objective of the common market 
as opposed to Article 352 TFEU that refers to all ‘objectives set out in the Treaties’.  
 
The German Court maintains that the involvement of the German legislature is crucial in 
these areas. The accompanying laws that were originally passed by the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat are therefore not sufficient to guarantee the necessary scrutiny of the German 
government when applying either Article 352 or 48.7 TFEU.  The Court insists that the 
government can only act at the European level with regards to these articles if and when it 
has received prior approval/instruction to do so by the Bundestag and – where necessary 
– the Bundesrat. According to the judgement only the explicit approval of the German 
legislature can provide the necessary legitimacy to increase EU competences.  
 
The judgement requires the legislator to strengthen the position of the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat27 vis-à-vis the European integration process and requires the German 
government to consult much more extensively with the German Parliament.28 The 
incorporation of national parliaments into the European decision-making process has 
been a popular subject and the idea was first launched in the Declaration on the Future of 
Europe29 annexed to the Treaty of Nice that called on the member state governments to 
consider ‘the role of national parliaments in the European architecture.’30 The Treaty of 
Lisbon took care of this idea and included a Protocol on the Role of National 
Parliaments31 that provides for a special procedure whereby national parliaments can 
block EU legislation and force the Commission to re-evaluate its legislative proposals. 
                                                       
27 The Bundesrat is only involved if and when relevant legislation affects the area of competence of the 
German Länder. 
28 Interestingly, the Constitutional Court also strengthened the role of the parliament vis-à-vis the 
government in two other – non-Europe related – judgement that followed the Lisbon judgement. See 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090617_2bve000307.html and 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090701_2bve000506.html.  
29 European Union (2001). 
30 European Union (2001). 
31 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0148:0150:EN:PDF.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
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However, the German Constitutional Court states that in cases when either the passerelle 
or the flexibility clauses are used, the Bundestag’s tacit approval cannot be taken for 
granted. Rather it is necessary for the German legislature to empower explicitly the 
German government to act at the EU level with regard to the aforementioned articles. It 
seems that the Court is thereby impeding the use of the two clauses by complicating the 
related national procedures. The fact that this would at best slow-down and at worst 
prevent future integrationist moves can be regarded as a welcome, if not wanted, by-
product. In fact, in light of the arguments made in the previous section, it seems clear that the 
Court finds that the aforementioned metaphorical line is crossed by the Lisbon Treaty’s 
passerelle and the flexibility clauses (the same is also true for the more restricted ‘emergency 
brake procedure’ of Articles 82.2 and 82.3 TFEU – see below). And though the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht does not strike down the Treaty, it installs instead stricter national 
control in order to prevent the clauses from being used to transfer any new or additional 
powers from the national to the EU level. In my view, the effectiveness of its ruling on this 
matter is questionable for three reasons. 
 
First, the judgement implies that the Bundestag has a distinct role not only to be informed 
by the German government (see Article 23.3 of the Grundgesetz)32 but to control and 
instruct it actively in the application of the two Lisbon Treaty articles 48.7 and 352. Of 
course it is important that any government informs its parliament of its activities, be it at 
the national, international or European level. Yet, it is questionable whether the 
government should be restricted in its activities, especially at the European and 
international level, by the need for explicit instructions to act. This is what the Lisbon 
judgement does: it restricts the German government in its capability to act at the 
European level, because the Bundesverfassungsgericht demands that any action needs to 
be first authorised by the German Parliament. The government may only act ‘if the 
                                                       
32 See http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/index.html.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
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German Bundestag and the Bundesrat have adopted within a period yet to be determined 
a law pursuant to Article 23.1 of the Basic Law which takes the purpose of Article 
48.7(3) TEU Lisbon as an orientation.’33 The use of 352 TFEU requires ‘constitutionally 
[…] ratification by the German Bundestag and the Bundesrat on the basis of Article 23.1 
sentences 2 and 3 of the Basic Law.’34   
 
According to my understanding of legitimacy and national parliaments, it is not evident 
why these houses of parliament should hold a legitimate mandate to participate in the 
decision-making procedure at the European level.35 National MPs are elected to form and 
hold to account their national government for its actions. But they do no not have a 
mandate to participate directly or indirectly in the decision-making process at the 
European level. This does not mean that a parliament should not control the government 
when it makes decision related to the EU, foreign policy, or even military actions. The 
argument made here is related to areas that do not fall within national competences, i.e. 
already existing European competence and thus areas in which national parliament no 
longer have a legislative prerogative and it is the governments that act in the best interest 
of their citizens. National parliaments should make sure that the government does exactly 
that: act in the best national interest but they should not be encouraged to legislate 
actively in areas and on policies for which they did not receive a mandate by their 
respective electorate. Furthermore, national parliamentarians are unlikely to have the 
necessary knowledge to form informed and independent opinions on subject matters that 
fall outside their legislative competences. Thus, the only motivation for parliamentarians 
to ‘control’ the government in these specific decisions surrounding Treaty Articles 48.7 
and 352 would be to score national political points which can hardly be the intention of 
                                                       
33 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 319. 
34 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 328. 
35 See also Kiiver (2006); Donnelly and Hoffmann (2003). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
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the Grundgesetz’s Article 23 which regulates the relationship between Germany and the 
European Union (which is incidentally the Article that the Court cites in demanding a 
closer and more active involvement of the Bundestag). 
 
Second, there is a substantial body of academic literature that questions the effectiveness 
of legislative control with regard to executive actions.36 This is of course not the place to 
analyse the German political system with a view to the effectiveness of the Bundestag to 
control the government. Yet, it is useful to point out that the German constitution seems 
to be much more concerned with guaranteeing a stable government through solid and 
continuous support by the Parliament than to arm it with legal and political weapons to 
scrutinise its every move. Historically, this is only logical given the experiences of the 
Weimar Republic. Practically it means that one of the key tasks of the German parliament 
is to provide the government with a working majority.37 Therefore, the governing parties 
will always control a majority in the Bundestag. It may be legally possible, yet, politically 
unlikely, that MPs from the same political party/parties that form the government at 
would withdraw their support for governmental actions at the European level (or on any 
other issues). Internal consultations as well as executive authority (especially with regard 
to European matters) make an effective and impartial scrutiny of the German government 
by the Bundestag unlikely. When combining this with the existing pro-European 
consensus among the current parliamentary parties (including the two largest ones, CDU 
and SPD), it seems inconceivable that the German parliament would stop the German 
government from taking decisions at the European level, that, after all, the government 
deems to be in Germany’s best interest. The current German political reality and 
constitutional tradition notwithstanding, the Court in its judgement is not only 
                                                       
36 See Hayward (2004) and Larking (2008).  
37 Note the ‘constructive vote of no-confidence’, which prevents parliament from creating a power 
vacuum by dismissing a government without installing a new one. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
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encouraging, but demanding closer scrutiny for the government’s action at the EU level. 
Failing to do so, or so the judgement leads us to believe, will force the Court to step in 
and protect German interests where necessary: ‘in Germany, participation must, on the 
national level, comply with the requirements under Article 23.1 of the Basic Law 
(responsibility for integration) and can, if necessary, be asserted in proceedings before the 
[German] Federal Constitutional Court.’38 
 
Third, the Court extends the parliamentary control also to the areas of criminal law and 
social security law (Articles 48.2 and 82.2/82.3 TFEU). In these matter only, the Treaty 
stipulates (in Article 82.2/82.3 TFEU) that any member of the Council can raise an 
objection and prevent legislation by referring the matter to the heads of state and 
government in the European Council. This provision gives an indirect veto power to any 
government representative by preventing a decision from being taken. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, obsessed with the dominant position of the Member States as 
‘masters of the treaties’39, would be expected to support this additional safeguard for 
member states governments. Yet, it declares that the German Council member ‘may only 
exercise this right on the instruction of the German Bundestag and, to the extent that this 
is required by the provisions on legislation, the Bundesrat.’40 The judgement thus declares 
that the relevant accompanying law must be amended to take into account the 
involvement of the German Parliament. Effectively, what the Court has done is, however, 
weaken the national government. If the Court’s demands were fulfilled German 
government representatives would be severely restricted in their actions and could not 
call for an ad hoc referral to the European Council because prior instructions to do so by 
the Bundestag are necessary. If anything, the Court paved the way for more not less 
                                                       
38 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 236. 
39 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 231, 235, 271, 298, 334. 
40 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 400. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
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integration, because ‘the more Community-friendly procedure is [and remains] the 
default.’41  
 
Since the obligation of the judgement, the German Bundestag has reconvened for a 
special session to amend the accompanying laws in order to guarantee compatibility with 
the Lisbon judgement. The Bundestag has ratified three new laws regulating the 
cooperation of government and parliament as well as three new laws regulating the 
cooperation between Bundestag and Bundesrat concerning matters related to the 
European Union42. The laws are in line with the judgement of the Court and thus require 
explicit instruction by the legislature for the government to act in areas of the passerelle 
and flexibility clauses. With regards to the aforementioned emergency clause, the 
Bundestag clearly saw the problems (i.e. its potential disability to act unless specifically 
instructed) and thus deviated from the judgement, stating instead that the government 
representative in the Council has to refer the issue to the European Council if instructed to 
do so by the German Parliament. The law does not, however, make the instruction a 
condition for referral meaning that the German government maintains the authority to act 
without the explicit instruction of the Bundestag or (where applicable) the Bundesrat43.  
 
5. Conclusion: The integration sunset? 
                                                       
41 Halberstam and Möllers (2009). 
42 See http://www.zeit.de/newsticker/2009/9/8/iptc-bdt-20090908-570-22334624xml; for the legislative 
documents (only available in German) see 
http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2009/26961025_kw37_begleitgesetz/index.html. 
43 The German states: ‘(1) Der deutsche Vertreter im Rat muss in den Fällen des Artikels 48 Absatz 2 
Satz 1, des Artikels 82 Absatz 3 Unter- absatz 1 Satz 1 und des Artikels 83 Absatz 3 Unterabsatz 1 Satz 
1 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union beantragen, den Europäischen Rat zu 
befassen, wenn der Bundestag ihn hierzu durch einen Beschluss angewiesen hat. (2) Wenn im 
Schwerpunkt Gebiete im Sinne des § 5 Absatz 2 betroffen sind, muss der deutsche Vertreter im Rat 
einen Antrag nach Absatz 1 auch dann stellen, wenn ein ent- sprechender Beschluss des Bundesrates 
vorliegt.’ See original Paragraph 9 of the Gesetze über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des 
Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union; Bundesdrucksache 
16/13923. Available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/139/1613923.pdf. 
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Overall, the judgement, although not preventing the Lisbon Treaty from entering into 
force, must be treated with great caution. Its potential for preventing future integration 
should not be under-estimated. If the German Constitutional Court is really going to find 
the (judicial) time and interest to apply its self-conferred ultra vires review powers, we 
could soon see a clash between the European Court of Justice and the German 
Constitutional Court. It is now easy to envisage a situation whereby the European Court 
upholds a specific legislative measure because it considers it to fall within the legal 
competences of the European Union, whereas the German Constitutional Court takes a 
different view and claims legal superiority over the ECJ, thereby questioning (if not 
challenging) the fragile legal structure that holds together the EU legal order and sees EU 
legislation taken precedence over national legislation in case of conflict. The German 
Constitutional Court suggests in its Lisbon judgement that it will strike down EU 
legislation, even if the EU has competences to act, in case the legislation is not in line 
with the German constitution. If anything, the Lisbon Treaty narrows the scope of 
legislation that can be considered in line (see the abovementioned list of state-defining 
powers). Adding to this the well-established role model functioning of the German Court 
with regards to other European constitutional courts, the consequences could be much 
more devastating than even the Court might anticipate.44  
 
This is not to say that the Lisbon Judgement marks the beginning of the end for the 
European integration process. Still, the Grundgesetz might say ‘Ja’ to Lisbon, but the 
German Constitutional Court might not necessarily do the same when it comes to future 
integrationist moves at the European level. The highest court of the most populous 
member state has just replenished its judicial stockpile in anticipation of future EU 
                                                       
44 In fact, the judgement has already motivated some conservative Czech Senators to demand increased 
control for the Czech parliament vis-à-vis its government with regards to passerelle and flexibility 
clause (L. Kubosova, 2009). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1499651
 15 
ambitions to press forward with an ever closer and ever more integrated Union – 
seemingly keen to become much more active in its defence of what it perceives to be its 
own German as opposed to European area of judicial competence. Thus, the Humboldt 
University might have to wait quite some time before another German foreign minister 
inspires its students with a European vision that is as bold as Joschka Fischer’s and yet 
remains compatible with the latest views of Germany’s Constitutional Court. 
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